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Property Tax in African Secondary Cities: Insights from the Cases of 
Kisumu (Kenya) and M’Bour (Senegal) 
 
Liza Rose Cirolia and James Christopher Mizes 
 
Summary 
 
This working paper adopts an urban lens on property tax. It focuses specifically on how 
property tax operates in two African secondary cities, Kisumu (Kenya) and M’Bour (Senegal). 
The paper identifies three factors shaping the low levels of property tax collection in the two 
case cities. These are the misalignment between the spatial scale of property tax collection 
and the utilisation of funds; constrained resources and capacity for collection; and tax 
administrators’ own perceptions of the legitimacy of property taxation. These factors have 
tangible effects on the everyday workings of property taxation. The cases also demonstrate 
that tax administrators make sustained efforts to improve taxation. While the same types of 
challenges are evident in the cities of Kisumu and M’Bour, how administrators respond 
reflects the unique and particular context of each place and the perspective of the 
administrators who work there. This finding confirms that local tax administrators are not 
simply the recipients of tax policy, but are active agents in shaping how policies operate in 
practice. Overall, improving property taxation requires interventions to address alignment, 
capacity, and legitimacy. However, rather than attempting top-down reform, this research 
suggests that building on the perceptions and practices of tax administrators will offer a more 
effective pathway to incrementally improving property tax in Africa’s smaller urban centres.   
 
Keywords: African cities; urban governance; property taxation; secondary cities. 
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Introduction: Africa’s urban revolution 
 
There is significant policy and scholarly interest in Africa’s urbanisation (Parnell and Pieterse 
2014). Over the past three decades, the rapid growth of urban areas has been coupled with 
the decentralisation of responsibilities to urban governments (Brosio 2000; Ribot 2002; 
Olowu 2004; Kauzya 2007). Decentralisation and urbanisation place increasing pressures on 
city authorities, large and small, expanding the scope and scale of their responsibilities 
(Farvacque-Vitkovic, Glasser, Mehta, Raghunath, Kilroy, Federico Barra and Salooja 2008; 
Briceño-Garmendia and Foster 2010). Despite this, cities and urban local governments have 
been poorly supported. Decentralisation and urbanisation remain deeply contested, with 
higher levels of government remaining ambiguous – if not hostile – to building urban 
autonomy and investing in urban areas (Bekker and Therborn 2012; McCluskey and Franzen 
2013).  
 
This report departs from the argument that African cities, despite their many and mounting 
challenges, are fertile ground for creative experimentation in finances and governance. From 
service provision models to financial payment methods, African cities are important sites for 
innovation and reform (Pieterse 2008, 2011; Simone 2011). The effective and creative use of 
fiscal tools and resources is key to ensuring that African urbanisation leads to more 
sustainable, just, and responsive cities and city governments (Paulais 2012; Berrisford, 
Cirolia and Palmer 2018). The limited resources and fiscal powers available to African urban 
authorities to grapple with the mounting challenges associated with urbanisation has had 
tangible urban effects, resulting in fragmented service delivery and uneven city development 
(Brosio 2000; Bardhan 2002; Ribot 2002; Bahl and Bird 2000). A stronger conversation 
between fiscal questions and urban development in Africa is imperative (McCluskey and 
Franzen 2013; Fjeldstad, Ali and Goodfellow 2017).  
 
Notwithstanding major differences between Anglophone, Lusophone, and Francophone 
African countries, most African cities rely on property tax as a key source of revenue 
generation (Franzsen and McCluskey 2017). However, there is widespread 
acknowledgement that property tax is not leading to the so called ‘virtuous cycle’ of urban 
investment and local government empowerment (Bahl and Bird 2000; Bahl, Martinez-
Vazquez and Youngman 2008; Collier 2016).  
 
This working paper focuses on property taxation in African secondary cities. Much of the 
country level research on property tax in Africa glosses over the unique challenges faced by 
secondary cities, aggregating national data and focussing on capital cities. Few policy 
accounts respond to the high levels of urban differentiation evident in Africa and the unique 
needs of secondary cities. Importantly, secondary cities are fundamentally urban, performing 
vital – even if seldom recognised – roles in the urban systems of countries and regions 
(Roberts 2014). They are home to more of Africa’s population than their primate counterparts 
(Satterthwaite 2007). In comparison to capital cities, secondary cities tend to have lower 
levels of fiscal autonomy, weaker private sector investment, and lower levels of revenue 
collection (Rondinelli 1983; UN-Habitat 1991; Roberts 2014). This reality limits the potential 
of secondary cities to serve their urban citizenry.     
 
Owing to the important role which secondary cities play in Africa’s urbanisation trajectory, 
there is clearly a need for improved fiscal and institutional arrangements for Africa’s smaller 
urban centres. To contribute to this important area of work, this working paper explores 
property taxation in two secondary cities in Africa: Kisumu (Kenya) and M’Bour (Senegal). 
The method used is a multi-case approach, selectively using comparison between the two 
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contexts where it is useful (Yin 2013).1 Importantly, the work is explicitly interested in the 
interface between property tax and city building. At the same time, it is explicitly mixed 
method, drawing insights drawn from qualitative, ethnographic, and grounded research 
methods. The cases address the following questions: how do Kisumu city and M’Bour city fit 
into the fiscal architecture of their respective countries? How do property tax systems work in 
each of the urban agglomerations? And what conceptual and policy insights can be drawn 
from these very different cases?  
 
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, these cases contribute to the large 
knowledge gap on Africa’s smaller urban centres, providing case material on relatively 
understudied places and issues. Currently, there is no publicly available information on 
M’Bour city’s urban property taxation or fiscal condition. For Kisumu city, some data exists, 
but it is largely out of date. Second, with an eye to reform, these cases contribute to efforts to 
improve the property tax and fiscal sustainability of the continent.  
 
 
1  Cities in context 
 
Our research is grounded in two African secondary cities, Kisumu (Kenya) and M’Bour 
(Senegal). In both cases, the focus is on the urban areas – what might be termed ‘the city’. 
Kisumu city and M’Bour city are explained in their national context below.   
 
Figure 1 provides useful information for understanding the basic characteristics of these 
secondary cities. It shows that Kisumu and M’Bour are both good examples of secondary 
cities, both in terms of size and in proportion to their capital cities. However, it also shows 
that the two cities are very different types of secondary cities, M’Bour being a metropolitan 
satellite area and Kisumu being a regional hub. The table also indicates that Kisumu has a 
formal city status. In contrast, M’Bour has no city status. 
 
Figure 1 Basic characteristics of Kisumu city and M’Bour city  
 
Characteristics   Kisumu city M’Bour city  
  
Population 500,0002 256,1293 
Capital city size (metro) 4,000,000 (Nairobi) 2,500,000 (Dakar) 
Type of secondary city Regional capital city   Satellite city of Dakar 
Economic base Agriculture and trade  Tourism and fishing  
Urban classification  City status (Urban Areas and Cities Act) None 
  
                                                          
1  The method includes analysis of financial data, legislation, and interviews (see the appendix for more details on the 
method). Interviews were conducted in Kisumu throughout 2017 and in M’Bour in late 2017 and early 2018. In both 
cases, the researchers have a considerably longer engagement at county level in both Kenya and Senegal, which was 
drawn into the contextual and policy analysis. 
2  Total population is calculated using the Census 2009 figure of 398,000 persons. This number has been adjusted, 
assuming a 2.8 per cent urban growth rate, compounded over eight years (Wagah, Onyango and Kibwage 2010). 
3  Total population is calculated using data from L’Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie for the year 
2015. http://senegal.opendataforafrica.org/SNVS2015/vital-statistics-of-senegal-2015?region=1006240-departement-
mbour. Total population presented here is a sum of the communes within M’Bour city for which data is available: 
M’Bour: 235,170. Ngaparou: 8,442. Saly Portudal: 9,887. Somone: 2,630.  
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1.1 Kisumu 
 
Kisumu city forms part of a Western cluster of towns on the edge of Lake Victoria. Kenya’s 
urban system is dominated by Nairobi and Mombasa (World Bank and The Republic of 
Kenya 2016). Nairobi is home to over four million people and is the apex of economic activity 
in the country; Mombasa is quite a bit smaller, but, like Nairobi, the city has the special 
designation of being a city-county.    
 
Below Nairobi and Mombasa there is a grouping of towns which are Kenya’s secondary 
cities. Kisumu is one of the largest in this cluster. Kisumu city is home to half a million people 
and growing at a rate of over 2.8 per cent (Wagah, Onyango and Kibwage 2010). Today 
Kisumu performs a key role as a regional city, attracting trade and movement from the wider 
region. After decades of underinvestment, the city is beginning to experience new 
infrastructure investments and a more dynamic property market.  
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Figure 2 Kisumu in national context 4 
 
Kisumu city falls under the jurisdiction of Kisumu County Government. Within the county, 
there is a department tasked with the management of the city area. The Department of the 
City of Kisumu manages the city area. The city area has the same boundaries as the now 
defunct Municipal Council of Kisumu, which was dissolved following the 2013 
decentralisation reforms.  
 
  
                                                          
4  Cartographer: Miriam M. Maina. Maps prepared with data layers acquired from Open Street Map and Global 
Administrative Database, with additional layers generated in Google Earth. Data layers downloaded in July 2018. This 
citation applies to all of the maps in this document.  
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Figure 3 Kisumu city and Kisumu County  
 
The spatial structure of Kisumu city includes the well-planned and serviced colonial core of 
the city, a belt of unplanned communities which surrounds the city, and the extended and 
rapidly developing peri-urban suburbs. The extended areas of the city were incorporated into 
the municipal boundaries of the city in 1972 (Syagga 1979).   
 
The majority of economic opportunities, services, and infrastructures are concentrated in the 
colonial city centre. In recent years, national upgrades to the major highways (A1 and B1), 
and the development of a bypass road which connects the highways and circumvents the 
city centre, has pushed development away from the historic core and towards the peri-urban 
suburbs.  
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1.2 M’Bour 
  
M’Bour city is located 80km south of the capital city of Dakar. M’Bour city is located on la 
petite côte (the little coast), which is bordered to the north by the town of Rufisque and by the 
Sine-Saloum delta to the south. Today, M’Bour is a focus of policy and investment for the 
Senegalese state. Two important investments are the new national toll highway which 
connects M’Bour to surrounding cities and the new international airport halfway between 
M’Bour and Dakar.5  
 
  
                                                          
5  The new Blaise Diagne International Airport is located midway between M’Bour and Dakar. The relocation of the airport 
is part of the state’s spatial development strategy that aims to connect Senegal’s cities via new and large-scale 
infrastructure projects.  
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Figure 4 M’Bour in national context 
 
 
M’Bour city is an urban agglomeration of five communes which fall within the Department of 
M’Bour (which includes 16 communes in total). The five communes in the urban 
agglomeration include: M’Bour (the commune, not to be confused with the urban area or 
department), Saly, Malicounda, Ngaparou, and Somone. These communes run along two 
infrastructural axes: one is the national road that leads towards the new airport, and the other 
follows the coast northward towards Dakar. Among the five communes in the agglomeration, 
Saly is the most established centre of tourism: it hosts the largest and most luxurious hotels 
in the region, which has driven the commune’s expansion of land development. M’Bour 
(commune), on the other hand, has significantly less resources per capita, but it is also the 
urban centre of the agglomeration.  
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Figure 5 M’Bour city 
 
 
2  Comparative data on the cities 
 
In both cities, land is a contested and complex issue. Without the widespread use of formal 
land titles (in Senegal), and with ample confusion within the titling system and property roll (in 
Kenya), controversies often emerge in over legitimate rights to ownership. Some of these 
controversies revolve around inheritance and are disputes among siblings over priority of 
ownership. But in many places, such as M’Bour and Kisumu, disputes also arise due to the 
sale of land in a growing property market. In Senegal and Kenya, purchasing land is a means 
of saving money, and it is often local notables, religious leaders, and state authorities that 
control access to land in peri-urban areas. While many purchase land with the intention of 
building a residence, in both urban areas a new class of investors has also begun to 
purchase land for the sole purpose of speculation and land development (Sadio 2009; Casse 
2011; Klopp 2000).  
 
However, in Kisumu city and M’Bour city there are established property tax systems.  
 
In Kisumu, there is a long tradition of property taxation (Anyumba 1995). Property tax was 
one of the first interventions of the British East African Protectorate, intent on developing a 
system of administration in the small colonial town in the early 1900s. In fact, the first 
boundaries of the township were demarcated based on tax collection (Home 2012).  
 
In contrast, property tax is new in M’Bour. It has been collected by the commune of M’Bour 
since its establishment as a local government in 1996. However, property taxes have only 
recently begun to be collected in the remaining four communes in M’Bour city. These 
communes were established in 2009 as ‘fully empowered communes’ which legislated the 
right to collect property tax. 
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A review of fiscal documentation in both cities indicates that property tax is an important 
source of revenue. In Kisumu city, property tax accounts for 22 per cent of the revenue 
generation of the Department of the City of Kisumu. Parking fees and business permits are 
the next largest sources, collecting between 80 and 90 million Kenyan Shillings (KES) per 
year (around US$ 778,210 to US$ 875,486).6 In M’Bour, the contribution of property tax to 
sub-national revenue varies across the communes. In Saly commune for example, property 
tax accounts for 23 per cent of the commune’s operating revenue; however, it is notably 
lower for other communes.  
 
In both Kisumu city and M’Bour city, property tax collection is low in absolute terms. In 
Kisumu city, collections are around US$3 per person per year and in M’Bour city they are 
around US$2.2  
 
Figure 6 Basic property tax data on Kisumu city and M’Bour city  
 
Tax information  Kisumu city M’Bour city 
Total annual collection  KES 138,194,757   
(US$ 1.34 million) 
XOF7 331,200,767 
(US$ 579,833) 
Per capita collection  KES 300 ($2.92) XOF 1,249 ($2.19) 
Tax basis and rate  Combination of flat rate (KES 1,500) and 
unimproved site value (1.5%) 
Estimated annual rental value (5%) 
Legislation for property 
taxation  
Valuation for Rating Act 2015 (266) 
The Rating Act of 2012 (267) 
Code Général des Impôts (loi n° 2012-31 
du 31 décembre 2012) 
 
To better understand the patterns of collection in both cities, it is necessary to explore two 
important things:  
- First, it is necessary to understand the fiscal architecture of sub-national urban 
government and the role which property tax plays within this. ‘Fiscal architecture’ refers to 
the institutional structure, rules, and laws which shape property tax collection, and is 
explored in Section 3 of this report.  
- Second, it is important to understand the management and practice of property taxation. 
Property tax ‘management and practice’ refers to the operations of property taxation at 
sub-national level. Within the established fiscal architecture (and at times beyond it), the 
management and practice of property tax determines how much is actually collected in 
both cities. This is explored in Section 4 of this report.  
  
                                                          
6 Using an exchange rate of US$ 1 = KES 102.8 (www.xe.com/currencyconverter/ 20 November 2018). This rate is used 
for all conversions from Kenyan Shillings to US Dollars. 
7  Using an exchange rate of US$ 1 = XOF 571.2 (www.xe.com/currencyconverter/ 20 November 2018). This rate is used 
for all conversions from CFA Francs (XOF) to US$. 
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3  Fiscal architecture of property taxation 
 
National public finance policy provides a framework for property tax collection and revenue 
utilisation. In both contexts, property taxation must be understood within the longer history of 
decentralisation reforms.  
 
3.1 Kisumu 
 
Kenya has a long history of attempted – and resisted – decentralisation reforms (Widner 
1993, Bassett 2016). Kenya became independent in the early 1960s. At decolonisation, 
Kenya inherited a parallel system of decentralised and de-concentrated urban local 
government, established under British colonial rule. In the drafting of the post-independence 
constitution, there was much debate over the merits and practicalities of decentralisation. 
The concept of majimbo, a Swahili term to describe the ideal ‘ethno-regional devolution’, was 
extensively debated. However, after the temporary establishment of regional administrations 
in the 1960s, the national state quickly dissolved the decentralised units in favour of 
strengthening the provincial administration system. During the postcolonial period, Kisumu 
city was jointly controlled by the Municipal Council of Kisumu and the Nyanza Provincial 
Administration. It was also a key site of political opposition to the national ruling party 
(Anyumba 1995).  
 
The 2007 election violence which swept across Kenya ushered in a new wave of 
decentralisation reforms (Cheeseman 2008). Between 2010 and 2013, decentralisation 
reforms were implemented in Kenya (Bassett 2016).8 These reforms created a two-tier 
system of government: national government and county government. The constitution and 
supporting policies concentrated political, administrative, and fiscal power with the newly 
formed county governments. The central government lost many powers and the 175 local 
authorities were dissolved (Rocaboy, Vaillancourt and Hugounenq 2013; Pal-Ghai 2015). A 
third tier of local government was not created to replace local municipalities.  
 
In this devolution process, the Municipal Council of Kisumu was dissolved, and Kisumu city 
was absorbed into the newly formed Kisumu County Government (see Figure 3 for the 
current boundaries of the city and county). The city came under the management of the 
Department of the City, a unit within the county (NB: departments within the county are 
administrative units. They are not to be confused with the departments in Senegal).  
 
Kenya’s constitution allows counties to collect revenues from several sources, including 
property tax. This is a notable shift from the previous system, wherein property tax was 
collected by the Municipal Council of Kisumu and utilised within the city area. Currently, 
property tax is the largest contributor to Kisumu County’s own-source revenue collection.  
Over 90 per cent of Kisumu County’s property tax revenues comes from collections within 
Kisumu city, with the majority collected in the city centre and older suburbs.9  
 
The Department of the City of Kisumu is responsible for revenue collection from the city area. 
Landowners pay their ‘rates’ at the Kenya Commercial Bank tellers located in the lobby of the 
City Hall. These payments are documented by the Department of the City.  
 
  
                                                          
8  In Kenya, these reforms are referred to as ‘devolution’. Devolution, as a term, highlights the political nature of the reform 
process.  
9  This can be seen by comparing the property tax collected in the county as a whole and the property tax collected in the 
city. The county data can be found in the annual financial statements.  
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Figure 7 Kisumu city organigram of property tax revenues10  
 
The revenue collected by the Department of the City flows to the County Revenue Fund and 
forms part of the total county income (including own-source revenue and grants from national 
government).11 Within the fiscal architecture, there is a disjuncture between who collects 
rates and who spends these monies. While the Department of the City is tasked with 
collection, the county is responsible for expenditure. Countries are required by law to 
undertake arduous budgeting processes to allocate all of the money received (from own-
source revenue and from grants) across the territory. In this process, the Department of the 
City of Kisumu is treated like the other departments in the county: it can request that the 
budget be allocated for development,12 operating and maintenance, and personnel 
expenditure.  
 
Notably, the Urban Areas and Cities Act of 2011, developed following the constitution, 
requires counties to develop city boards to manage smaller urban centres, such as Kisumu 
city (Bassett 2016). This would allow monies collected in these urban areas to be ringfenced 
for use within the urban area. As Nairobi and Mombasa are city-counties (meaning that the 
city stretches the full extent of the county), boards are not imperative.13 Kisumu (like all of 
Kenya’s smaller towns), however, is not a city-county; there is a city area within a much 
larger rural and peri-urban county. Only very recently has a city board been established to 
manage Kisumu city. As Kisumu is the first smaller city to appoint a board, little procedural 
precedent has been set. It is unclear if the revenue collected in the city, such as property tax, 
will still be redistributed across the county, or if the newly established board has managed to 
negotiate to control this revenue.14 According to many interviews, the redistribution has, 
since the establishment of the county, been heavily biased towards rural investment, and not 
city expenditure.15 
                                                          
10  Interview with Assistant Manager: Finance and Admin (2 May 2017).  
11  In 2017/18, Kisumu County received 2.17 per cent of the national allocation to the 47 counties, amounting to KES 
6,553,400,000 (around US$ 63,749,027) in unconditional transfers, and several smaller conditional grants. The 
allocation to Kisumu County is determined annually, legislated in the County Allocation of Revenue Act. 
12  The ‘development’ category is similar to a capital budget in conventional public finance terminology. However, it 
includes costs associated with development spending which would generally be excluded from capital. It is thus a fuzzy 
term, without clear accounting boundaries.  
13  Interview with World Bank municipal finance expert in Nairobi (20 May 2017). 
14  Personal communication with appointed Board Member Sam Okello at the Mistra Urban Futures Conference, 8 November 
2018. 
15  Interview with VC of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University of Science and Technology (24 April 2017); interview with 
previous Mayor of the Municipal Council of Kisumu (28 April 2017); interview with Director of Economic Planning, 
Kisumu County Government, Kisumu (24 November 2017). 
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3.2 M’Bour 
 
M’Bour’s contemporary fiscal architecture reflects Senegal’s multiple rounds of 
decentralisation reforms. Senegal inherited a regional framework from the French colonial 
administration in which each region had a dominant city with its own mayor. Since 
independence, Senegal has undergone three rounds of decentralisation reforms (Loi No. 
2013-10: 1).  
 
The first of these reforms was carried out in 1972 under the first president, Leopold Senghor, 
directly after independence. This law established ‘rural communities’ as an equivalent to their 
urban counterparts (communes) located in Senegal’s major cities. The second reform in 
1996, however, had much greater impact on local urban governments. This law expanded 
the number of communes in urban areas – 19 in Dakar and eight in the urban agglomeration 
of M’Bour – and also created an intercommunal government called the ‘region’. But in 2013, 
these laws changed yet again. Act III of decentralisation erased both ‘the region’ and ‘rural 
community’ as local governments, and instead replaced them with the commune and a new 
intercommunal government called a ‘department’ (see Loi No. 2013-10). Today, the 
Department of M’Bour coordinates the communes within its territories, including those within 
M’Bour city. 
 
Before 2009, M’Bour was the only local government within its urban agglomeration that was 
legally established as a commune. In 2009, a coastal section of the adjacent Malicounda 
(then a rural community) was legally established as a commune and given the name of Saly, 
through a contested political manoeuvre.16 In the same year, the interior section of 
Malicounda was established as a commune. Similarly, Ngaparou and Somone – located 
further north up the coast – were also established as communes in 2009.  
 
The establishment of the communes was a significant political and fiscal change. Rural 
communities did not collect their own taxes, and the central state only levied a head tax – the 
minimum fiscal – on rural populations. They did not hold elections, but instead named the de 
facto village leader (chef du village) as mayor. Establishing these rural communities as 
communes provided the political authority to hold elections and the fiscal authority to levy a 
new set of local taxes on the population.  
 
Establishing local governments as communes is what permits them to receive the revenues 
from property tax collection. This means that M’Bour was the only local government receiving 
property tax prior to 2009. The remaining four communes only began receiving this tax once 
they were created in 2009. This recent history of territorial organisation has created 
budgetary and material inequalities among the communes in the agglomeration. For many 
communes, central state distributions have decreased after the recent decentralisation 
reforms. As rural communities were established as communes, there was an increase in the 
number of local governments requiring central state distributions. In terms of own-source 
revenues, property taxes and business taxes constitute the largest portion of revenues for 
the five communes in M’Bour. Yet the largest and greatest number of businesses and 
properties are located in Saly, which is an upscale tourist destination with an established 
market for secondary residences.  
 
                                                          
16  Prior to the establishment of the communes, Malicounda was a ‘rural community’ constituted of the 22 villages that 
encompassed the area north of M’Bour. In 2009, when Saly was established as a commune, the mayor of Malicounda 
was Ousmane Gueye. Gueye had recently broken ranks with the Socialist Party, which was the party in power during 
Abdoulaye Wade’s presidency (2000-2012). The mayor’s assistant in Saly noted that this break was unpopular with 
Wade, who responded by annexing the most valuable (in terms of tax resources) territory of Malicounda and 
establishing it as the commune of Saly. The commune then held its first election in 2009 in which Gueye ran against the 
nephew of Abdoulaye Wade, Ndouga Sakho. Despite this effort to weaken his political influence, Gueye won the 
election and has been the mayor of Saly ever since. From this perspective, the creation of Saly was a failed political 
sabotage, but has nevertheless had the lasting effect of deepening inequalities in the urban agglomeration of M’Bour. 
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Today, the Department of M’Bour coordinates 16 communes, including the five communes 
that constitute the urban agglomeration of M’Bour. No formal institution coordinates among 
these five agglomerated ‘urban’ communes, and the partition of communes in the urban 
agglomeration has a political history that has resulted in vast inequalities in communal 
resources among these five communes.  
 
All line items in the budget of M’Bour city’s communes correspond to the legal nomenclature 
of the Senegal National Tax Code. Revenues are first divided into two large categories: 
operating revenues and investment revenues (this contrasts with Kisumu, which divides 
revenues into transfers and own-source revenue). The majority of communal revenues are in 
the operational revenues section, and it is common for investment revenues to be entirely 
constituted of central state transfers (fonds de concours). Also, any savings or surplus 
revenues from operating can be carried over into the next year’s investment revenues. In this 
way, communal investments from own-source revenues almost exclusively come from 
annual budget surpluses.  
 
Like all communes in Senegal, the M’Bour city communes’ operating revenues are further 
divided up into the four following legal categories: products of exploitation (Chap 70), 
products of public domain (Chap 71), local taxes (impôts locaux), and municipal taxes (taxes 
municipales). Local taxes are administered by the Department of M’Bour, a deconcentrated 
agent of the central state, while municipal taxes are administered by the communes 
themselves.  
 
Property tax forms part of the local taxes. There are two central state institutions who are 
responsible for property tax. The national tax office, the General Directorate of Taxes and 
Customs (Direction Générale des Impôts et Domaines – DGID) is responsible for the 
establishment of the property taxation rolls. The Tax Collection Agency (La Perception), 
within the General Directorate of Public Accounting and Treasury (Direction Générale de la 
Comptabilité Publique et du Trésor), is responsible for receiving payments for property tax, 
using the rolls developed by the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs. Both have 
regional offices in M’Bour city.  
 
Figure 8 M’Bour city organigram of property tax revenues 
 
19 
 
All local taxes which are collected belong to the communes. Communes have a high level of 
autonomy in deciding how to use these (limited) funds. However, the communes have no 
legal right or obligation to carry out any of the administration for these taxes: this rests 
entirely with the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs and the Tax Collection Agency. 
The communes do not control the administration of their own revenues and expenditures. 
Local governments are subject to the principle of the single fund (l’unité de caisse), which 
requires that all governmental revenues are deposited in a single account managed by 
central government. This means that local governments do not have access to revenues, but 
instead have a legal right to request expenditures in accordance with their annual approved 
budgets and based on their collections and transfers. The Tax Collection Agency of M’Bour 
is the local institution of the national treasury which administers revenue collection and 
expenditures on behalf of the M’Bour communes.  
 
 
4  The management and practice of property tax 
 
The fiscal architecture provides a framework for property tax collection. However, within this 
framework, the amounts which are collected are a function of management and practice at 
the local level. This section looks at the management and practice of property tax collection, 
why it operates in this way, and how it shapes urban development processes in the two 
cities.   
 
4.1 Kisumu 
In Kisumu, property tax is colloquially called ‘land rates’ owing to the fact that the default tax 
basis is land value. As discussed in the above section, land rates are the largest collection 
stream of the Department of the City and, unlike other sources of revenue, are a steady and 
reliable stream.17 This can be seen in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 10 provides an indication of the rates collected in the city as a proportion of the city 
revenue collection, county revenue collection, and county total income. These proportions 
show that rates are an important source of revenue for the department. However, at the 
county scale, where all revenues are eventually consolidated, rates are less significant. The 
large grants received from the national government dwarf the city’s rates contribution.  
 
Figure 9 Department of the City of Kisumu collection (in KES) 
 
Revenue streams 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
Land rates       120,002,382        129,635,191        138,194,757  
Single business permits         84,382,849          88,748,755          81,022,720  
Rents          30,181,713          35,604,969          40,955,012  
Bus park fees         78,489,050          84,756,350          76,284,500  
Market fees         63,856,275          61,723,245          52,459,370  
Building plans         19,077,867          17,897,651          42,630,357  
Sign board promotion          55,683,113          56,610,761          59,986,988  
Sundry revenue         42,837,886          47,632,441          12,376,746  
Public health and others           3,049,000            2,427,644            9,501,800  
Parking fees         75,839,331          81,305,291          89,815,950  
Total        573,399,466        606,342,298        603,228,200  
Source: compiled by authors based on data given by the Department of the City of Kisumu 
                                                          
17  The dips which can be seen in 2016/17 for a number of other revenue sources are likely linked to the election and post-
election violence which took place in that year. This made particular types of collection more difficult, for example, 
collections for markets or bus parks.  
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Figure 10 Property tax relative to city and county income 2016/17 (in KES) 
 
2016/17 City rates collection 
Kisumu city property tax % of city own-source revenue 23% 
Kisumu city property tax % of county own-source revenue 14% 
Kisumu city property tax as % of county income (own-source and grants) 2% 
Total property tax collected in Kisumu city 138,194,757 
Source: County data 18 
The Department of the City uses the 2007 valuation roll as the basic instrument for property 
taxation. It is used by the Department of the City to ascertain the landowners and the amount 
they should pay. The current roll was developed by the now defunct Municipal Council of 
Kisumu and adopted in the 2008/2009 fiscal year. The valuation roll only covers the 16 
‘blocks’ which formed the colonial city of Kisumu, and three areas which are tangential to the 
old city centre, Migosi, Kanyakwar and Manyatta A.19 These areas all use leasehold tenure. 
In these areas, a rate of 1.5 per cent of the land value is used for rating purposes. The 
blocks, which cover the CBD and Milimani areas, pay the highest average rates.20 
 
Most areas outside of the colonial core of the city are not included in the 2007 valuation roll. 
However, in 2008, all areas which fell within the 1972 city boundary and which were not 
included in the 2007 roll were gazetted to be included in the rating.21 This land is largely 
freehold tenure as it was converted from ‘native land’ to trust land, and finally to registered 
and titled private land through the Land Consolidation Act and the Land Adjudication Act. In 
contrast with the areas covered by the valuation roll, to pay property tax in any of these 
areas, a title is not necessary, but some sort of legal documentation is required.22 These 
areas currently pay a flat rate of 1,500 KES. In contrast to the high-yielding zones like the 
CBD and Milimani, the freehold areas contribute very little to Kisumu’s rates collections.  
The 2007 roll is now grossly out of date. The Kisumu County Government is interested in 
developing a new roll which reflects contemporary land prices, subdivisions, and the 
properties which were excluded from the 2007 valuation roll.23 There is the widespread belief 
among officials and land experts that there is great potential for income generation which can 
be addressed by updating the valuation roll and expanding the areas which are covered by 
the roll. As one expert noted, only around 30 per cent of properties are covered by the 
current valuation roll.24  
 
While the dated roll is a challenge, the limited collection and enforcement capacity of tax 
administrators is a more pressing issue. Given the limited capacity of the county and the 
Department of the City, property tax collection is a passive exercise. The department does 
not send property tax bills to landowners nor does it actively go out to collect monies.25 
Landowners must come to the City Hall to find out how much they need to pay and to make 
their payments.26 In general, there is weak enforcement. While there is a penalty for non-
payment, it is generally not enforced by the department. Kisumu’s tax administrators contend 
that there is widespread underpayment in the city centre and in the extended areas of the 
city. However, they argue that this underpayment is for very different reasons.  
                                                          
18  Based on email correspondence and data sent by Kisumu City Department of Finance, CFO, Chief Accountant 
(November 2017). 
19  Interview with Head of Rates (15 November 2017).  
20  Interview with city surveyor (17 November 2017). 
21  The following areas are listed in the 2008 gazette: Pandpieri, Nyalenda A, Nyalenda B, Kanyakwar A, Kanyakwar B, 
Kisule, Manyatta B, Konya, Mkendwa, Kogony, Dago, Nyahera, Korando, Ojolla, Marera, Wathorego, Buoye, Nyalunya, 
and Bar. 
22  Interview with Head of Rates (15 November 2017). 
23  Interviews with the Kisumu County Head Accountant (11 April 2017); the Kisumu County Chief Officer of Lands, 
Housing, Physical Planning and Urban Development (7 April 2017) and Roack Consult (10 November 2017). 
24  Interview with Roack Consult (10 November 2017). 
25  Interview with Head of Rates (15 November 2017); interview with the Director of City Finance (27 April 2017). 
26  Interview with Head of Revenue (2 May 2017). These payments are made to the Kenya Commercial Bank tellers in the 
City Hall lobby. Kenya Central Bank takes a substantial percentage as a fee for administration.  
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In the city centre, non-payment is most prevalent among the elites and the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).27 These actors recognise that there is limited enforcement and feel 
‘above the law’. In addition, they have access to lawyers which the Department of the City 
cannot afford.28 Local elites and national entities feel unthreatened by low level 
administrators.  
 
In the extended areas, on the other hand, non-payment is linked to poor service delivery. 
Officials argue that people do not pay rates because they have received little from the state. 
This perception is not uncommon in Kenya. It is widely believed that taxation without 
infrastructure and service delivery is illegitimate (Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen 2014). In this 
case, officials condone non-payment, and its corollary, their own non-collection. The Head of 
Rates said she would not collect rates in areas where infrastructure, in particular public 
markets and access roads, are not provided by the state. These two services, she argued, 
were the most basic which needed to be provided to legitimise rates collection. She said: ‘I 
would be embarrassed to collect rates if we have not provided.’ Similarly, a minister 
emphatically argued: ‘Here in Kenya we believe unless we get services we are not going to 
pay rates!’29 
 
While the importance of services as a source of rating legitimacy is well noted, the 
Department of the City has little control over the provision of most urban services. It therefore 
has little power to improve the legitimacy of rating. In 2016/17, only 3 per cent of the County 
‘Development Budget’30 was allocated to the Department of the City. Responsibility for 
investment in Kisumu city is split between the county (line departments), the central 
government, and SOEs, which are owned by the two tiers of the state. Neither Kisumu 
County nor the national state have a huge incentive to improve property tax management in 
the city. The impact of rating on county budgets is very small.  
 
4.2 M’Bour 
 
The Department of M’Bour collects property tax on behalf of the communes in M’Bour city. In 
M’Bour city, a total of XOF 179,266,700 (around US$ 313,842) was collected in 2016. This 
works out to an average of XOF 35,853,340 (around US$ 62,768) per commune within the 
urban area. However, there are huge variations in collections between the communes. The 
commune of M’Bour collects by far the largest absolute amount, followed by Saly (which 
collects less than half of what M’Bour does). This is not surprising as M’Bour is the most well 
established and Saly has high property values along the coast. This can be seen in Figure 
11.  
  
                                                          
27  Interview with Head of Rates (15 November 2017). 
28  Interview with Director of the City (27 April 2017). 
29  Interview with Minister of Roads, Transport and Public Works (15 April 2017).  
30  In Kenya, expenditure is classified into development, operations and maintenance, and personnel. ‘Development’ 
loosely aligns with the idea of a capital budget; however, it also includes recurrent expenditure linked to development 
projects. It is therefore a somewhat blurry category.  
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Figure 11 Commune-level collections (2016) (in XOF) 
 
Selected revenue 
streams 
Somone Ngaparou Saly M’Bour Malicounda 
Municipal tax (taxes 
municipales and 
exploitation products) 
51,380,480 49,105,680 92,323,000 439,500,000 196,646,503 
Local tax (impôts 
locaux) 
38,099,751 46,448,142 251,007,000 784,760,455 50,969,620 
Business taxes 4,297,943    24,578,777 142,758,000 331,600,455 22,026,871 
Property taxes (built and 
unbuilt land) 
27,106,700     14,742,318 108,249,000 152,160,000 28,942,749 
Products of the public 
domain  
28,302,517 25,487,815 29,728,000 471,100,000 27,600,000 
Central state transfers 32,000,000 47,000 106,000,000 100,000 74,000,000 
Total revenue 149,782,748 296,068,367 480,175,000 2,562,559,620 411,152,086 
The selected revenues shown are not the only revenues received by the communes but are those that are most relevant to this 
paper. The total revenue is therefore not a sum of the selected revenues but is included to give an idea of the relative 
importance of different revenues. 
Source: Rapport d’Audit Organisationnel et Financer de la Commune de Saly Portudal: L’Agence de Développement 
Municipale. Administrative Account (compte administratif) for 2015 for the Commune of Ngaparou and Commune of 
Malicounda. The majority of data provided by communes was revenues from the fiscal year 2015, and the Tax Collection 
Agency provided data from the valuation rolls of 2016.  
As can be seen in Figure 12, the proportion of total commune revenue which property tax 
represents differs between the communes. In M’Bour city, property tax on built land 
constitutes nearly 60 per cent of M’Bour’s revenue, a quarter of Saly’s annual revenues, and 
a fifth of Somone’s revenue. In contrast, in Ngaparou Malicounda, it is 5 per cent and 7 per 
cent respectively. This observation confirms that property taxes are significantly more 
important in dense urban areas than they are in rural ones. This difference is not surprising, 
given the relatively higher collection rates and land values in urban areas.31 Further, tax 
administrators in M’Bour explain this difference in terms of the difficulty of collecting taxes on 
unbuilt land, and the majority of land in rural areas is unbuilt. Tax collectors locate property 
tax payers through field surveys, and it is significantly more difficult to find owners of land 
that do not reside on the property to be taxed.  
 
Figure 12 Property tax on built land as a % of total commune revenue (2015) 
 
Property tax on built land collection 
Somone property tax as % of revenue 18% 
Ngaparou property tax as % of revenue 5% 
Saly property tax as % of revenue 23% 
M’Bour property tax as % of revenue 59% 
Malicounda property tax as % of revenue 7% 
Source: Rapport d’Audit Organisationnel et Financer de la Commune de Saly Portudal: L’Agence de Développement 
Municipale. Compte Administratif de 2015 for the Commune of Ngaparou and the Commune of Malicounda. 
 
The available data shows a significant gap between the tax base that appears on the 
valuation rolls and the revenue that communes receive for taxes on built land. In Saly, for 
example, revenues for 2015 are less than half (43 per cent) of the recorded tax base from 
2016. These discrepancies reflect the difficulties with collection. This was certainly the case 
in Malicounda. In Malicounda, the revenue from taxes on built land in 2016 was XOF 
                                                          
31  The revenue data also reveals the importance of the boundary fees in equalising the differences in property tax 
collection. Malicounda’s total revenues for 2015 are 85 per cent of Saly’s, whereas Ngaparou’s revenues are 62 per 
cent. And we see that the category in which boundary fees are included, ‘Taxes municipales and exploitation products’, 
has the largest revenue difference between Ngaparou and Malicounda. Ngaparou’s revenue here is 25 per cent of 
Malicounda’s, a difference attributable to its significant collection of boundary fees. Ngaparou has a low percentage of 
property tax as a portion of total revenues (5 per cent) and low collections of boundary fees. 
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34,758,600 (around US$ 60,851), or 57 per cent of the XOF 60,485,139 (around US$ 
105,891) recorded as the tax base for this same year.  
 
Historical data on Saly commune shows a significant drop in property tax revenues between 
2012 and 2013, and an overall decline in revenues to 2015.32 However, since 2013, property 
taxes have remained around one quarter of total operating revenues. Despite the constant 
relative percentage of property tax revenues, this data shows both wide variation in absolute 
revenues from year to year, as well as an overall reduction in the past four years. Saly today 
is likely collecting only half of what it was five years ago, despite the reported increase in 
land speculation and investment during this time. 
  
Figure 13 Saly property tax 
 
Commune of Saly 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Property taxes 213,405,000   142,915,000    169,980,000   108,249,000    
% of operating revenue 49% 28% 22% 23% 
Source: Rapport d’Audit Organisationnel et Financer de la Commune de Saly Portudal: L’Agence de Développement Municipale.  
 
In Senegal generally, and in M’Bour city specifically, the tax basis used is the annual rental 
value. The annual rental value of the building is determined by the cadastral method.33 Field 
surveys are the primary way in which the tax base is established and taxes are collected. 
There is an active updating of the roll by the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs 
using the annual census.34 This census is not an annual overhaul of the entire tax base, but 
the ad hoc addition of properties missed in previous rolls. 
 
For the M’Bour city communes, the rolls were developed in 2009 and only small additions 
have been made year on year. The cadastral method requires that the field surveyors fill out 
a form (described above in the property identification section), with the property owners’ 
contact information and the annual rental value. But surveyors do not always make every 
required update to the existing tax rolls. For example, a tax collector at the Tax Collection 
Agency noted that the taxes due for a large compound in Saly were about a quarter of what 
they should be for a building of its size and location.35 It is unclear how often there is an audit 
or update of existing rolls, but tax administrators noted that such discrepancies were 
common.36  
 
Figure 14 Number of property taxpayers as per 2016 roll 
 
2016 valuation rolls Somone Ngaparou Saly M’Bour Malicounda 
No. of properties 
(taxable build land) 
408 206 1,617 8,426 313 
Total amount 87,183,462 22,872,321 250,760,367 304,143,528 60,485,139 
Source: Data provided by the M’Bour Tax Collection Agency.  
In cases of buildings with multiple apartments, enumerators used the rental value reported by 
renters in the building. The value is not based on actual rental payments, but on the 
                                                          
32  Saly is the only commune which provided the research team with historical data which could be analysed.  
33  The cadastral method is a field survey in which a technician establishes land value based on elements like area, number 
of rooms, existing installations, and construction material used. In Senegal, this often means surveying available residents 
on monthly rent and then counting the number of rental units in a building.  
34  Some new additions are from what are called anticipated payments (paiements par anticipation (PPA)) and are due to 
self-reporting. Tax administrators noted that the majority of people who declare a PPA are European foreigners 
(toubabs), and it was highly unlikely that a Senegalese citizen would pay taxes in advance without being notified. 
35  Interview with Tax Inspector (8 January 2018). Interviewer noted that he knows this taxpayer well, and said that the rolls 
had been done before she had made significant additions to the structure by adding two more levels. 
36  Interview with Tax Inspector in the Tax Base department at the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs (9 January 
2018). 
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estimated annual value. This allows enumerators to collect information from the renters 
present and estimate the total rental value of the building based on the number of 
apartments. Enumerators often find this number by using the number of water or electricity 
meters as a proxy.37 For buildings that are not rented but occupied by owners, tax 
administrators use an estimate based on similar properties in the immediate area that are 
rented. These estimated values are negotiated by field staff with taxpayers at the time of the 
census. One tax administrator noted that the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs 
does not have enough personnel to do a full analysis of each property. Instead, they use a 
general rental value that they estimate for different zones of the communes, based on their 
own knowledge of the market.  
 
Although the property tax is legally imposed on the owners of buildings and the land on 
which they are located, ‘ownership’ is not as clear in practice, nor is it necessary for property 
taxation. The majority of residents do not have property titles, and instead hold a different set 
of documents that administrators refer to as contracts or deeds (actes). The most commonly 
held deed is a surface right (droit de superficie), that has been issued to many residents as 
part of a central state effort to increase the usage of land titles. These leases give residents a 
right to occupy land for 50 years and were intended as a stepping stone into individual 
leasehold with formal property titles. Tax administrators, however, do not necessarily need 
these documents to include a property on the rolls. Tax administrators can record heads of 
households during tax enrolment surveys even without documentary proof of ownership or 
right to occupation. Tenure issues are thus not relevant in M’Bour’s property taxation 
management.   
 
To collect taxes, tax collectors at the Tax Collection Agency receive copies of the annual tax 
rolls created by the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs and use this information to 
locate taxpayers themselves. However, Senegal does not have a formal addressing system, 
and the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs’ census only includes information for villa 
number, neighbourhood, and city. Although some entries on the roll have phone numbers, 
many do not. This does not provide enough information for exact location and requires a field 
survey in order to request payment in person. Therefore, the Tax Collection Agency is 
required to conduct its own field surveys to locate taxpayers and enforce payment.38 
Collection by the agency is organised by sector, which corresponds to neighbourhoods within 
the communes, and there are three or four agents who conduct field surveys. This work, 
however, is not always successful. Tax administrators at the agency argued that that finding 
the ‘owner’ is one of the key obstacles to enforcing property taxes.39 As one administrator 
pointed out, they have spent up to five years looking for a single taxpayer without ever 
finding them. This is the primary reason why taxes are overwhelmingly not collected on 
vacant land and often also not collected on built land.   
 
While the challenge of finding taxpayers is a major issue, administrators in the Tax Collection 
Agency and customs also noted that they were reluctant to collect taxes from people who 
they believed to be poor.40 Administrators argued that people often do not have the means to 
pay; they have other familial obligations that limit their liquidity – such as weddings, funerals, 
and baptisms. Although a property tax is a tax on wealth, administrators do not view it as a 
tax on the wealthy (i.e. as a progressive tax) in its legal application. Many landowners have 
inherited their land from family, and other familial situations mean that the property owner 
does not have the immediate access to the monetary wealth needed to make cash 
payments. One administrator brought up the example of widows who are largely dependent 
                                                          
37  Interview with Collection Coordinator of the Tax Collection Agency of M’Bour (6 December 2017). 
38  A minority of taxpayers pay voluntarily at La Perception after having received billing from the General Directorate of 
Taxes and Customs. Tax administrators suggested that it is predominantly foreigners who pay on time or in advance (as 
mentioned previously). 
39  Interview with Collection Coordinator of the Tax Collection Agency of M’Bour (6 December 2017). 
40  Interview with Collection Coordinator of the Tax Collection Agency of M’Bour (6 December 2017). 
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on their children’s income, but are nevertheless the owners and primary residents of the 
building. Another administrator recognised that the spirit of the property tax law was not to 
tax the primary residence of families, but instead to tax speculation. He made a distinction 
between land that is used as a primary residence and land that is purely for speculation, 
suggesting it is only the latter that should be subject to tax. Such primary residences, then, 
should be omitted from the tax rolls by tax enumerators.  
 
 
5  Micro-efforts to improve the property tax 
system  
 
Despite the many challenges, administrators make significant efforts to improve property 
taxation within their jurisdictions. The following section unpacks these various efforts. They 
are grouped into three categories including efforts to address: fiscal policy issues, collection 
practices, and the legitimacy of the tax. These efforts confirm that local tax administrators are 
not simply the recipients of tax policy, but are active agents in shaping how policy operates in 
practice. 
 
5.1 Efforts to address fiscal property issues 
 
In Kisumu city and M’Bour city, the mismatch between who is responsible for collections and 
who has the right to utilise the funds collected is apparent to tax administrators. Clear 
incentive problems arise from this mismatch. In neither Kisumu or M’Bour is the collector 
incentivised to increase collections, as they do not see any of the benefits (in terms of 
revenue). In both cases, officials have sought to rectify this mismatch. 
 
In Kisumu, city officials have been agitating the county government for the creation of a city 
board which would have the right to control the revenues collected in the urban areas. The 
recent successful establishment of a city board in Kisumu allows for the revenues collected 
within the city area to be utilised by the city board. The creation of the board has the potential 
to tighten the relationship between rising land values, collection, and investment. Importantly, 
however, the board is appointed by the Governor (with approval from the County Assembly). 
While a useful step in addressing the rural bias of the county, there remain questions as to 
the board’s ability to be accountable to the people of Kisumu city, given that it is not 
democratically elected (Bassett 2016).  
 
In M’Bour, the incentive mismatch is dealt with through the (informal) allocation of commune 
staff to the General Directorate of Taxes and Customs. Although the Tax Collection Agency 
is legally responsible for tax collection, the communes have also established a tradition of 
informal support as a way of compensating for the lack of personnel available for field 
administration. Communes donate personnel, vehicles, and fuel to the Tax Collection Agency 
in an effort to increase the amount of revenue collected in their commune. Some communes 
have even approved this support as a line item in their annual budgets. The Tax Collection 
Agency therefore relies on this informal support. It also relies on the communes’ personnel to 
locate taxpayers, an informal process that requires a local knowledge of communes that the 
agency does not have. The communes of Saly and M’Bour both contribute dedicated 
personnel who are at the disposal of the agency. Although these administrators are provided 
by specific communes, they work across all communes in the M’Bour department for which 
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the agency is responsible. The communes have each negotiated an informal repartition of 
responsibilities between themselves and the agency.41 
 
5.2 Efforts to improve collections 
 
In Kisumu city and M’Bour city there are limited resources for collection and the enforcement 
of payments. Like in many African contexts, tax enrolment and collection units are 
understaffed and underfunded. However, in Kisumu and M’Bour, officials make efforts to 
deploy resources in a manner which they deem to be efficient and effective. In both cases, 
administrators focus on areas and property owners whom they can compel to pay.  
 
In Kisumu, tax collectors focus on land developers, both small and large. The main lever 
used by tax administrators to compel rates payments is the building plan approval process. 
Officials use the planning approval process as a passive coercive measure to force rates 
payment. As Kisumu’s lead City Planner points out: ‘We can only get you into paying when 
you want our service. Like, for example, plan approval.’42 Notably, people cannot build 
without a permit. Building without a permit will attract the attention of local police (called 
askaris) who extract bribes from people who are building on property without the correct 
planning permits.43 This process makes non-compliance expensive and forces many people 
into compliance with planning rules and, by extension, rates payments. While dubious, the 
approach of linking tax payment to planning approval has been successful; nearly 25 per 
cent of rates collected annually come from ‘back paid’ rates. The Department of the City 
collects a decent amount of revenue through this channel.  
 
In M’Bour, administrators focus their efforts on the wealthy ‘planned areas’ where it is easier 
to identify property owners. Administrators work to improve collections by making it easier to 
find property owners. To solve the problem of the lack of addresses, the General Directorate 
of Taxes and Customs created a system of plot addressing, working along two axes. Moving 
away from the ocean, lots are labelled in ascending order from A-J, all the way to the main 
road. In a perpendicular direction, moving from north to south along the beach, lots are 
labelled from 1-8. This means that all lots are labelled with a two-digit code. This system is 
only effective, however, in neighbourhoods that are laid out in a grid, which includes the 
wealthier planned areas. These areas thus become the focus of tax collection.    
 
5.3 Efforts to address legitimacy 
 
Tax administrators argue that collecting property tax, even when it is legally owed, is not 
always socially legitimate. There are very different arguments for non-payment and non-
collection made by administrators in Kisumu and in M’Bour. In both contexts, tax 
administrators’ collections are shaped by these perceptions of legitimacy and micro-efforts 
are made to improve the legitimacy of the tax.  
 
In Kisumu, a blind eye is turned to those who do not have services and refuse to pay. This is 
seen by officials to be legitimate. As the Head of Rates noted: ‘You cannot go to an area to 
collect rates when you know you have given them nothing.’44 However, the Department of 
the City works to improve the legitimacy of property taxation by allocating their (very small) 
                                                          
41  In the case of Saly’s property tax collection, they have instituted this repartition by building type. The Revenue Services 
Office at Saly conducts a census and collection for résidences, and enclosed vacation resorts with multiple villas. The 
Municipal Secretary at Saly noted that the Tax Collection Agency does not keep up-to-date rolls without the support of 
the commune. He provided an old census from 2012-2013 which shows a large gap between the actual number of villas 
and the number that are registered on the official tax rolls. The census conducted by SAPCO (Agency for the Planning 
and Promotion of Coasts and Tourist Zones of Senegal) in January 2013 showed 1,727 existing villas, whereas the Tax 
Collection Agency had enrolled only 642 villas by December of 2012. This means that 1,051 villas were left off the rolls 
for the 2012 fiscal year. This is an ongoing challenge where the rolls remain constantly out of step with reality.  
42  Interview with lead City Planner for Kisumu (27 April 2017). 
43  Interview with small-scale developer (15 November 2017). 
44  Interview with Head of Rates (15 November 2017). 
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capital budget to the services seen as most essential for increasing tax collection. The 
2016/17 development budget for the Department of the City includes a large market project 
of KES 13 million (approximately US$ 126,459), and a number of road projects ranging 
between KES 5 and 10 million (around US$ 48,638 to US$ 97,276). While these projects are 
small (as the total city budget is only KES 120 million – around US$ 1,167,315), they 
represent a commitment to enhancing the legitimacy of rates collection. 
  
In M’Bour, there is a sense that people are poor and cannot pay. To remedy this challenge of 
poverty and make collection more ‘fair’, officials noted that nearly all Senegalese people pay 
taxes in smaller increments throughout the year.45 Recognising that people are poor, they 
allow them to pay in small amounts, and are lenient with the amount and timing of payments. 
In addition, M’Bour’s administrators focus on the wealthy/foreign areas of the city. When 
going to the field, tax administrators place the greatest emphasis on collection in wealthy 
neighbourhoods organised along grids (which thus also have addresses which are easy to 
find). 
 
 
6  Implications for property tax reform in 
African secondary cities 
 
The lessons from Kisumu and M’Bour provide insights with wider relevance and application. 
In this section, we draw out three important recommendations for reforming property taxation 
in secondary cities. Notably, these recommendations should not be read as policy 
prescriptions, but as useful considerations.  
 
6.1 Alignment 
 
In Kisumu city and M’Bour city, there is a misalignment between the agent responsible for 
the collection of tax and the sphere of government with the right to utilise the collected 
revenues. In Kisumu, collection is at a smaller scale than utilisation. The Department of the 
City collects, and the county utilises the funds. In M’Bour it is at a larger spatial scale. The 
central state collects and the communes utilise the funds.  
 
Tax experts would not see the difference between Kisumu and M’Bour as a novel insight. It is 
well recognised within the African property tax literature that Francophone and Anglophone 
countries have different systems of decentralisation, with consequent implications for tax 
collection. However, this misalignment between collection and utilisation raises two issues 
which are particularly important for smaller urban centres.  
 
First is the issue of incentives. With a mismatch between revenue collection and utilisation, 
there is limited incentive for administrators to increase collections. Administrators who are 
tasked with collection do not get to enjoy the benefits of their efforts. This is more extreme in 
M’Bour than in Kisumu, given the recent establishment of the board. They do not see the 
fruits of their labour reflected in higher revenues. Neither are they able to shape the 
investments which are made to increase land value and thus strengthen taxation. Reflecting 
on her incentive to increase collections, the Head of Revenue in Kisumu said: ‘Nothing 
[incentivises me]; we just care because now in my case like they in charge I’ll compare what 
my predecessors collected, so I would expect mine to go up with time. Just that.’ 
 
Second is the issue around the urban scale. City development requires coherent investments 
which stretch across the urban fabric, cross-subsidise between areas, create balanced and 
                                                          
45  Interview with Collection Coordinator of the M’Bour Tax Collection Agency (6 December 2017). 
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integrated development, and produce urban value which can in turn be captured through 
rising land values. Urban planning, and the investment in infrastructure and services which 
support these plans, is best done at the scale of urban agglomeration. However, in both 
cases, planning and investment does not take place at the urban scale. There is, in this 
sense, little possibility of linking urban investment with urban value creation and capture. This 
plays out in different ways in the two cities under study. In Kisumu, the outcome is a rural 
bias. Revenue collected in the city is spread thinly across the much larger county. In 
contrast, in M’Bour, we see fragmented investment. A good example is the secondary road 
which runs parallel to the existing national highway connecting Malicounda, Saly, and 
M’Bour. This secondary road begins in Saly and stops abruptly at the border with M’Bour. 
 
In terms of recommendations, property tax can be improved with the development of urban-
scale institutions which are responsible for revenue and expenditure. This is particularly 
important for smaller urban centres. Secondary cities have been of little concern in the 
design and implementation of decentralisation processes on the continent. While larger 
urban centres occupy ‘special’ positions within the fiscal architectures (in the case of Nairobi, 
it is a city-county, and in Dakar there is a metropolitan government), secondary cities’ urban 
structures have remained under-supported. If property taxation is to be reformed, there is a 
need for a clearer alignment between the agencies responsible for collection and utilisation 
and the urban scale in smaller urban centres.  
 
6.2 Capacity 
 
Another important consideration is the issue of capacity. The literature on secondary cities in 
Africa highlights the capacity constraints which many secondary cities face and with which 
property tax administrators across Africa must grapple (Bahl et al. 2008; Franzsen and 
McCluskey 2017). The cases of Kisumu and M’Bour corroborate this. In M’Bour, staff at the 
Tax Collection Agency suggest that there are not enough resources from the central state to 
support the work necessary to expand the tax base. In Kisumu, there is also a very small and 
under-skilled team. In both cases, administrators have to focus their efforts on the areas 
which are most likely to yield revenue. They are unable to apply a uniform collection and 
enforcement method within their jurisdictions.   
 
In terms of recommendations, reform processes should put more emphasis on building the 
capacity of property tax administrators and supporting efficient collection processes. This sort 
of focus will likely increase revenue more than investing in fancy and hi-tech instruments 
(such as digitised valuation rolls) which increase the number of plots which could be 
collected from, but do not increase the capacity to collect. Key to this is producing low-tech 
instruments which reflect the ways in which collection actually takes place in these cities. For 
example, if payments are made in intervals (rather than lump sums), the payment book 
needs to have space to document these (see the case of M’Bour in 5.3 above). If rates can 
be linked to the provision of another service, which people are more likely to pay for (such as 
planning approvals), this can also make collections more efficient (see the case of Kisumu in 
5.2 above).  
 
6.3 Perceptions 
 
Another important issue is the legitimacy of property tax, particularly from the perspective of 
the administrators who are tasked with collection. In both cases, the perceptions of property 
tax administrators fundamentally shape how they go about collecting the tax.    
 
Underpinning the question of legitimacy are the assumptions about what property taxation is 
meant to fund. Tax administrators across the two cities have very different ideas about why 
people are meant to pay tax. The Kisumu case reflects a perception that property tax is paid 
for particular services. Other research suggests that this view may be common across other 
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parts of Kenya (Ali et al. 2014). In contrast, in M’Bour, property tax is understood to be paid 
for the general operations of the commune. If you are poor, it is considered unfair to be 
expected to pay in a lump sum (or in certain cases, to be expected to make any payment 
whatsoever). 
 
While the literature on public finance varies, most Anglophone literature sees property 
taxation as a progressive wealth tax, paid by all property owners for the provision of non-
divisible services (Bahl, Linn and Wetzel 2013). However, as we have shown above, property 
tax administrators clearly do not see the tax in this way. There are many possible reasons for 
this, the most likely being the fact that many poor people in both Kisumu and M’Bour do, in 
fact, own land. Since they have no intention of selling this land and have few options for 
‘leveraging it’, it is not seen to be a financial asset and thus taxation does not reflect 
progressive taxation on wealth. Imposing the perspective that universal property taxation is a 
progressive ‘wealth tax’ does not resonate with the perspectives of those tasked with 
implementation. Without the de facto support of administrators, change is unlikely, if not 
impossible. These two cases show that administrators – through the creation of new 
instruments, exceptions, and informal activities – implement ways of collecting property taxes 
which they deem to be fairer, but which ultimately limit collections. It is apparent that they 
adapt taxation laws to reflect their own perceptions.  
 
In relationship to the question of legitimacy, reform processes should work with, rather than 
against, administrators’ perceptions of legitimacy. A strong reform process should engage 
with those responsible for implementation, seeking to understand and incorporate the 
perceptions of what might be termed ‘street-level bureaucrats’.   
 
7  Conclusions 
 
This paper provides a multi-case and comparative analysis of property taxation in Kisumu, 
Kenya and M’Bour, Senegal. The study is primarily interested in how secondary cities – 
Africa’s smaller urban centres – operate. This work is uniquely focused on the urban 
operations of property taxation and the practices and perceptions of tax administrators.  
 
The findings support and extend the existing literature on public finance in African cities. 
Despite the many differences between the cases, there are shared challenges related to 
alignment between institutions, capacity to collect taxes, and the legitimacy of property tax.  
 
The cases show that tax administrators are working to address these challenges in 
incremental and small-scale ways. In this sense, local tax administrators are not simply the 
recipients of tax policy or law, but are active actors who shape property tax practice.  
 
In terms of policy, there is a clear need to improve urban-scale institutions in smaller African 
cities. In addition, building on the existing practices and perceptions of tax administrators 
provides an important avenue for tax reform. This is likely to be more fruitful and effective 
than top-down, standardised, legalistic, and hi-tech reforms.   
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Appendix 
Primary data collection 
 Kisumu  M’Bour 
Financial data - Financial statements of the Kisumu County 
Government (2013/14-2016/17) 
- Financial statements for Kisumu Municipal 
Council (2007/8-2011/12) 
- Monthly and annual income from Kisumu city 
- Communal budgets  
- Communal administrative account (compte 
administratif) reports  
- Rapport d’Audit Organisationnel et Financer 
de la Commune de Saly Portudal: L’Agence 
de Développement Municipale 
 
Legislation 
and policies  
National legislation  
- Rating Act (2012) 
- Valuation for Rating Act (2015) 
- Urban Areas and Cities Act (2012) 
- The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 
(2010) 
- Public Finance Management Act (2012) 
Kisumu legislation and policies  
- Kisumu Integrated Strategic Urban 
Development Plan (ISUD) (2013) 
- Kisumu County Finance Act 
- Kisumu County Allocation of Revenue Act/Bill 
- Kisumu County Integrated Development Plan  
National legislation  
- République du Sénégal (2013) Loi No. 2013-
10 du 28 décembre 2013 portant Code 
général des Collectivités locales 
- Direction Générale des Impôts et des 
Domaines (2013) Code Générale des Impôts 
 
Field work  
 
- April/May 2017 (six weeks) 
- November 2017 (four weeks) 
- November 2017 (two weeks) 
- January 2018 (one week) 
Interviews  - Sectional Head of Rates Unit (Department of 
the City of Kisumu) 
- Head of Finance (Department of the City of 
Kisumu) 
- Chief Revenue Officer (Department of the City 
of Kisumu) [over the course of this research 
there were two: both were interviewed] 
- Consultants responsible for the production of 
the new valuation roll 
- Kenya Commercial Bank representative 
responsible for large-scale land development 
projects 
- Expert/academic in the field of land tax and 
property development  
- Assistant City Manager (responsible for the 
financial units within the Department of the 
City of Kisumu) 
- Head of City Planning (Department of the City 
of Kisumu) 
- Head of City Planning (Kisumu County) 
- Accountant for the Kisumu Urban Project 
- Head of Treasury (Kisumu County) 
- Director of Office of Local Governments, 
General Directorate of Taxes and Customs 
- Director of Department of Financial Services 
(DSF) for M’Bour, Direction Générale des 
Impôts et Domaines (National Tax Office) 
- Tax Controller, DSF M’Bour 
- Director, M’Bour Tax Collection Agency  
- Head of Recovery, M’Bour Tax Collection 
Agency  
- Recovery Agent, M’Bour Tax Collection 
Agency  
- Municipal secretaries at five communes in 
M’Bour agglomeration 
- First Deputy Mayor of the Commune of Saly 
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